"Network neutrality" and "open access" are two policies designed to preserve openness on the Internet. Open access mandates openness of conduits (e.g. television cable and DSL) to intermediaries (e.g. America Online), while network neutrality mandates openness to advanced content (streaming video, interactive e-commerce, etc.). We develop a systems model with free entry and competition in all three industry segments (conduits, intermediaries, and content) and examine the effects of the two types of regulation. We find that open access does not necessarily result in more openness of content and is not a substitute for network neutrality.
Introduction
May the owners of communications infrastructure choose who accesses that infrastructure? Frequently this question is cast in terms of content and conduit. Owners of cable television conduits do choose which channels to carry. Owners of telephone conduits are common carriers and may not discriminate among callers who produce telephone "content."
That much is clear, but the picture is clouded when intermediary firms are added between the conduit and content. That is the situation today with regard to Internet access, and in this paper we provide a framework for thinking rigorously about openness with intermediaries. States (Hausman 2002) . 1 More recently, there has been concern that open access is not enough, and network neutrality has been proposed as an alternative, stronger policy (Wu 2003) .
Part of the cause of this controversy is that two regulatory traditions are clashing (Hogendorn 2005) . More important, technological change has created new types of intermediaries, including Internet Ser-vice Providers, portals, virtual conduit operators, and content aggregators. Like telephone resellers, intermediaries are the middlemen between the conduit and the content, but unlike in telephone, they are not common carriers with regard to content. This means that openness of the conduit to service providers (what is meant by "open access") is not equivalent to openness to content (what we argue is or should be meant by "net neutrality").
No clear principle has been developed as to which type of openness is more desirable. Telephone common carrier regulation favored openness to content, but that rule was laid down long before there was a distinction between telephone company and intermediary. The first Internet intermediaries were the dial-up ISPs. These were initially a perfectly competitive industry of small firms, and they behaved like common carriers even without regulation (Greenstein forthcoming) . Indeed, the technology of the Internet made it difficult for early ISPs to control web page content in any way. Now intermediaries are much larger, more technologically diverse, and less competitive. They have more incentive and ability to control content. This paper provides a framework for analyzing policies toward openness. The central decision in the model concerns an intermediary that sells subscriptions to consumers and also sells access to content providers.
This means the intermediary is a two-sided network (Rochet and Tirole 2006 ) that must determine a "price structure," i.e. whether to favor the consumer or the content side of the market. Here we focus on the content side, where the intermediary has conflicting incentives: to offer a large amount of content in order to attract subscribers or to limit content competition in order to create rents which it can expropriate.
Our model addresses the same general question as Gehrig (1998) , namely whether the owner of a marketplace gains or loses from hosting more firms. In his paper, when there is sufficient differentiation between markets, there is an interior equilibrium in which market owners will balance the conflicting incentives of variety for consumers versus rent extraction from producers. This result echoes the systems model of Church and Gandal (1992) who also find interior equilibria when software firms choose which of two incompatible computer platforms to develop for. Although we use different mathematical techniques, we also find a similar interior equilibrium. Rubinfeld and Singer (2001) consider vertical integration and vertical restrictions in broadband, but the setting and results are not the same. They examine the incentives of broadband conduits to treat their own vertically integrated content preferentially or to foreclose it to other conduits. They argue that a firm like Time Warner might have an incentive to exclude content on its America Online service that competes with content produced by Time Warner. Church and Gandal (2000) show a similar result in a hardware-software system. van Schewick (2007) verifies that even non-monopolist intermediaries have incentives to discriminate; this is a key underpinning of our model. Chipty (2001) empirically finds that vertical integration does cause foreclosure in cable television.
The results of these papers have parallels in our model, but in our case "vertical integration" occurs between two downstream segments, the service provider and the conduit. Content, in our model, is always independent, and restrictions come through higher prices.
Our paper offers three contributions. First, it includes three industry segments -conduits, intermediaries, and content providers -and allows for free entry in each segment; previous papers generally consider only two conduits or intermediaries. Second, we do not assume that intermediaries are open to all content; instead they choose how much content to offer endogenously. Third, we examine the effect of open access and network neutrality regulation on this choice. There is some empirical evidence supporting our results in the related premium TV market. In this market we can think of cable TV companies as integrated conduits/intermediaries and channels as content. Savage and Wirth (2005) find that potential entry of additional cable television carriers causes incumbent carriers to offer more channels. And Anderson, Fjell, and Foros (2004) (Chipty 2001) . The supply chain for broadband Internet is even more complex, consisting of a large number of platforms (Greenstein 2000) . Most of the platforms are competitive markets, but Greenstein notes that continued competition is not assured. For purposes of analysis, we consider three layers: conduits, intermediaries, and content firms. 3 Content Firms. The meaning of "content" has expanded relative to traditional media like television. While movies and TV-type programming are among the categories of broadband Internet content, online retail stores, mapping services, instant messaging, and so forth also provide content. 4 Probably the most contentious form of content from a current policy perspective is voice over IP (VoIP) telephony. Already there has been at least one case of a service provider blocking a VoIP content provider. 5 3 Wireless data has a similar structure. We think it is likely that calls for open access and/or network neutrality will develop in wireless, and we believe our model translates directly to that setting.
4 Communications networks also allow users to communicate with one another and host their own personal content. Coffman and Odlyzko (2002) 2. Alternatively, the user may not be sure of 60 Minutes' address, in which case she might run a search on "60 Minutes" using Yahoo.
In that case, she uses link C for local connectivity and link 2 to reach Yahoo. Yahoo provides information on 60 Minutes' web address, which is sent back over link 2. Then the user uses link 1 to communicate directly with the CBS website.
A more complex case occurs if the user uses link 2 and finds 60
Minutes content directly through Yahoo's "Video" page. At that point, the video is made available directly within a Yahoo-branded video player as part of a paid relationship with the television network. The CBS content is completed mediated by Yahoo through link 3.
There is a key transformation from case 2 to 3. In case 2, Yahoo provides a service, but the only intermediary between the user and her chosen destination on the web is the ISP. But in case 3, Yahoo has become an intermediary. CBS and Yahoo have an alliance, and Yahoo was not in any way required to provide CBS the link from its main page, and indeed it does not provide similar links to competing TV content.
This may seem like business as usual, but it essentially changes who is the most important intermediary.
Most of the early discussion of openness on the Internet focused on link C, and the question was whether more than one ISP could use the same conduit. More recently, there has been some refocusing of attention on link 2, as companies like Google and Yahoo have worried that they might face higher prices or degraded service in the absence of network neutrality. There has been almost no discussion of the openness of link 3. Indeed, the lack of openness of link 3 seems to be taken for granted as an important component of Internet business models.
The purpose of this paper is not necessarily to argue that link 3 must be opened. But we do think it is vitally important to analyze the effect on link 3 of policies directed at links C or 2. Since link 3 is not open,
there is nothing about those policies that necessarily leads to overall, end-to-end openness on the Internet, and this needs to be considered in the policy debate.
US Conduit Regulation
Because of this potential for market power in the conduit layer, mergers involving telephone or cable television firms have led to calls for regulation. The late 1990s mergers of AT&T with TCI and MediaOne led Portland, Oregon and other cities to call for a choice of ISPs on these conduits rather than a single vertically integrated ISP (FCC 1999 
The Model
Our model focuses on competition among content firms, intermediaries, and conduits. We believe the interaction of all three is crucial to an understanding of the broadband policy debate. This is especially so because broadband content is a very innovative industry with potential to affect the overall economy while the intermediaries and conduits are more specialized.
The Game
There are M online households which value content, connectivity, and other services. Any number of conduits may serve these households by building infrastructure. We consider three policy regimes:
1. Under closed access, each conduit operates one vertically integrated intermediary, and this intermediary chooses how much content to offer.
2. Under open access, each conduit must provide (implicitly at a nondiscriminatory price) access to intermediaries, but intermediaries can still choose the amount of content to offer.
3. Under full network neutrality, each conduit must provide (implicitly at a nondiscriminatory price) access to intermediaries and each intermediary allows all content on a nondiscriminatory ba- Open access is the most complex, so we build our model around it and then consider closed access and network neutrality as special cases.
For the open access case, the firms compete in a three-stage game: (i) conduits and intermediaries enter the market; (ii) intermediaries negotiate alliances with content firms; (iii) consumers choose one conduit and one intermediary and purchase a variety of content through their chosen intermediary.
Stage 1: Entry. Let the number of conduits that enter be N C and the number of intermediaries be N I . Respectively, their fixed costs of entry are F C , the capital cost of the conduit, and F I , the setup costs of the intermediary. We assume these costs are identical for each potential entrant.
Stage 2: Intermediaries Negotiate Alliances with Content
Firms. Let there be a large pool of potential content firms, and those which enter become monopolistic competitors. We interpret this to mean that each content firm offers roughly the same type of content (e.g. multiple music servers) but with some horizontal product differentiation. Of course there are in fact many types of content, but our "representative type" approach is equivalent to having many different types, provided the cross-elasticities between types are low so they do not compete with one another.
Each intermediary i chooses to negotiate an alliance with n i of these content firms. In exchange for hosting its product, a content firm pays an access fee equal to a share of its profits. The outcome of this bargaining is that content firms pay a share α(N I ) of their profits, where mediary i is π(n i ). The profile n = n 1 , . . . , n N I describes the number of content firms available on all N I intermediaries. To be clear, we are not suggesting that intermediaries will block existing, conventional websites. The content firms we have in mind are part of the higher-quality tier of service that network neutrality advocates have expressed concern over. 20
We assume any costs of hosting content are constant, and without loss of generality let them be zero. We also assume that there are no fixed costs of entry for content firms. This assumption allows us to focus on the number of content firms without concern for the identity of each firm. 21
Stage 3: Consumers Subscribe to Conduits and Intermediaries and Consume Content. Each consumer single-homes by purchasing subscriptions to one and only one conduit and intermediary.
We discuss the possibility of consumers multi-homing on more than one intermediary in the conclusion. Consumer utility from (any) one conduit is t, reflecting connectivity and other conduit services like cable TV and/or telephone service. Utility from an intermediary has two components: utility from access to content (more is better) and idiosyncratic utility for each intermediary based on marketing, technology, the user interface, etc.:
We model consumer choice using multinomial logit demand, with v(n i ) the systematic utility attributable to observable characteristics of the intermediary and i the unsystematic utility with a type-1 extreme value distribution. Intermediaries can obtain revenue from subscribers 20 Forrester Research has predicted that more content will move to a closed network that will mirror the Internet, see "A New Tech Battle for the Home. The Wall Street Journal, January 3, 2005.
21 Adding fixed costs is not a problem as long as α is low enough that content firms have sufficient operating profits to cover the fixed costs.
through a combination of monthly subscription fees, service charges, and indirectly through advertising. Thus, the intermediaries capture a share β(N I ) of v(n i ). Likewise, conduits capture a share β(N C ) of t. 22
Since consumers buy content only through their intermediary, content competition takes place separately on each intermediary. We model this competition using a reduced form of monopolistic competition.
Spence (1976, pg. 410) argues that "The entry of an additional product has several effects. It increases the surplus from the new product, but lowers the demand for existing products and causes them to contract output. In terms of the surplus, there are gains and losses." This suggests that π(n i ) is decreasing and that v(n i ) is increasing and concave. The total surplus (per subscriber) from content production and consumption on intermediary i is
In most monopolistic competition models, the total surplus, gross of any fixed costs, is increasing in the number of firms, provided that consumers value variety enough (Mankiw and Whinston 1986) . But what matters to the intermediary is the portion of total surplus it can appropriate to itself. Here that is:
The behavior of this appropriable surplus function s(·, ·) is crucial to the outcome of the model. If s is increasing in n, then even a monopoly intermediary would want to offer as much content as possible. If, on the 22 It would be preferable to model the subscription price-setting subgame explicitly.
However, analytical difficulties have always limited 2-stage quality-price games to the case of duopoly (see Shaked and Sutton (1982) for pure vertical differentiation, Ferreira and Thisse (1996) for Hotelling horizontal differentiation with quality choice, and Rhee (1996) for the multinomial logit with quality choice). Using a duopoly model to study broadband would assume away a main policy goal, namely entry of additional conduits and intermediaries into the market.
other hand, the following property holds, then an intermediary would choose an interior profit maximizing number of content firms:
Decreasing Surplus Property (DSP):
DSP is a statement about the intensity of competition between content providers. Given a fixed number of subscribers, total profits, nπ(n), decrease sufficiently in n to overcome the increase in the appropriable share of consumer surplus from the increase in n. This is clearly not true if β, the share of consumer benefits appropriable by the intermediary, is large, but it is likely if β is small. 
Equilibrium
Stage 3. We solve the game backwards to find a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium. For now, let consumers choose a conduit and an intermediary in "mix-and-match" fashion -any intermediary can be used along with any conduit. We assume that consumers pay the conduit directly for its service, and intermediaries do not pay the conduit anything. All conduits offer the same services that give utility t, so they have equal market shares.
Consumers choose intermediaries according to the multinomial logit model. The strength of the unsystematic utility is parameterized by the variance of , which we denote σ. The larger is σ, the stronger are the tastes of each consumer for his or her preferred intermediary, regardless of the number of content firms available on other intermediaries.
The outcome of the stage 3 subscription decision is a market share function, which gives the probability that a consumer chooses intermediary i given the profile of content firms available on all the intermediaries:
The closed form of this market share function is one of the advantages of logit models. See Anderson, de Palma, and Thisse (1992) for detail on the derivation and application of the logit to theoretical oligopoly models. The intuition is that each firm's market share is proportional to the utility offered by that firm compared to the total utility offered by all firms. Market share Φ i increases in the number of content firms on intermediary i and decreases in the number of content firms on intermediaries other than i. Since the total number of consumers is M, the number of subscribers to intermediary i is Φ i (n)M .
Stage 2. In stage 2, the intermediaries noncooperatively choose the number of content firms. For any n i , the intermediary receives α(N I )π(n i ) per subscriber from each of the n i content firms. The total profit of intermediary i, including revenue from both content firms and subscribers, is
In equilibrium, all intermediaries simultaneously maximize (2), and we have the following result:
Proposition 1: For sufficiently large σ, there is a symmetric Nash equilibrium in which all intermediaries host n * content firms and have equal market shares Φ i (n * ) = 1/N I . 23 If DSP does not hold, each conduit hosts every possible content firm, while if DSP holds, 24 the profitmaximizing n * is an interior solution to
We begin by determining which values of n i are candidates for equilibrium. We then prove that the profit function is everywhere concave for these values.
The derivative of (1) is
Thus, the first order condition (3) can be written
The first term of (4) is negative by DSP; the second term is always positive. The second order condition is
The first and second terms are negative by DSP. The third term is negative for concave v. The fourth term is nonpositive for the case of
. For the case of Φ i < 1 2 , we note that if the sum of the third and 23 For low σ, there may be a vertically differentiated, asymmetric equilibrium as in Shaked and Sutton (1982) , but this can only be found numerically. 24 Actually DSP is sufficient but not necessary; as long as s is decreasing in n and not too convex, the interior equilibrium exists.
fourth terms is negative, the entire second derivative is negative. Thus a sufficient condition for the SOC to hold is
The first terms of (5) are positive, so the inequality holds if the bracketed term is negative. Rearranging that term gives
If σ is sufficiently large, then (6) holds because the positive first term approaches 0.
The first term in (3) is the profit effect. It indicates that a portion of the surplus in the content market becomes profit to the intermediary.
Under DSP, the intermediary cannot capture as much of this surplus when it hosts more content firms. Working against this effect, the second term in (3) is the demand effect. It shows that hosting more content firms increases the market share of an intermediary. But the demand effect diminishes in n, so under DSP there may be an interior optimum number of content firms. To guarantee that the optimum is interior, it is important that the market cannot be tipped to one dominant intermediary. Church and Gandal (1992) showed that this requires strong enough heterogeneity in consumer preferences for the intermediary itself, as opposed to its quality level, and in our model the consumer preference parameter is σ. Thus, we need sufficiently large σ to prevent market tipping.
Denote the stage 2 equilibrium total surplus that solves (3) by S(N I ) = s(n * , N I ). The effect of changes in N I on total surplus is Lemma 1:
Proof: From (4), n * is the solution to
The derivative of (7) with respect to N I is:
Solving for dn/dN I gives
All terms in both the numerator and denominator are negative, so we have shown that First, when an intermediary's market share falls, content firms on that intermediary make smaller profits, lowering the profit effect. Second, the intermediaries lose negotiating power and consumers retain more of their surplus, which strengthens the demand effect. For both reasons, intermediary competition increases the number of content firms hosted on each intermediary. In turn this reduces the intermediary's surplus.
Stage 1. Assuming that the intermediaries are sufficiently differentiated to achieve a symmetric equilibrium, they enter the market until
There must be a solution to (9) under DSP.
Conduits are symmetric by assumption, so they also have a symmetric free-entry condition: 
Closed Access
Under closed access, there is no longer any requirement that every intermediary be accessible using every conduit. Referring to free-entry condition (9), we know that intermediary profits are decreasing in the number of intermediaries. Thus, conduits can in general increase total profits by foreclosing access to all but one intermediary. (With enough consumer preference for variety in intermediaries, two or more intermediaries could be optimal, but we will not examine this case). Thus, we will model closed access as a regime in which each conduit vertically integrates with one intermediary, forcing N I = N C . 25 From the point of view of our model, the separate consumer choice of a conduit disappears, and the intermediary problem from the last section is solved again, but with different parameters. Specifically, the fixed cost of an integrated intermediary/conduit is F C +F I , and the appropriable surplus function now includes the constant t:
First, note that the number of conduits may increase under closed access because an additional source of profit has been added to the 25 Vertical integration is optimal in our model because the equilibrium of Proposition 1 involves market power, and integration essentially removes doublemarginalization in the number of content firms.
conduits' profit functions. This is the main justification telephone and cable firms have used when lobbying for closed access, saying that they need the extra revenue to pay for capital investment in new conduits.
We now consider the effect of closed access on content and intermediaries. First, we look at the change in content holding the number of intermediaries constant. Next, we look at the change in the number of intermediaries, and last we look at the overall effect on content including the possibility of a change in the number of intermediaries.
There is more incentive for a vertically integrated conduit/intermediary to host content because it sells more services (dv = t) to customers and thus customer market share is worth more. One way to interpret this is that under open access, there is a type of double-marginalization, and it is removed under closed access. The increase in content works to decrease S while the additional service offerings work to increase it. The net effect on surplus can go in either direction, but we can bound it from above because a one unit change in v always causes no more than a β unit change in surplus through subscriber revenue.
Lemma 2:
Changing from open to closed access increases the content per intermediary and increases surplus by less than β, holding the number of intermediaries constant:
The derivative of (7) with respect to v is:
There is no change in Φ when v changes (unless v changes so much that the equilibrium number of firms changes), so the second term drops out.
Solving for dn/dv gives
All terms in the numerator and denominator are negative, so dn dv > 0. S v = s n dn dv + β and s n is negative, so S v is bounded above by β. Now consider the effect on the number of intermediaries. There are two important differences in the competitive situation of open access intermediaries versus integrated conduit/intermediaries: (i) stand-alone intermediaries do not have to build physical infrastructure, so their fixed cost of entry is lower (possibly much lower) and (ii) stand-alone intermediaries do not offer the non-content related services that give consumers utility t.
These conflicting effects make the comparison of closed to open access ambiguous. Totally differentiating (9) and noting that v increases by t and that the change in fixed cost is F C , we find that the change in the number of intermediaries is:
The denominator is positive because S N is negative by DSP, so equation (11) indicates that the free entry number of intermediaries responds negatively to the increase in fixed cost and positively to the increase in service offerings t.
We can put this comparison in terms of easily measured changes according to the following proposition:
Proposition 3: The number of intermediaries falls under closed access if and only if the percentage increase in fixed costs is greater than some fraction of the percentage change in surplus due to increased service offerings:
In free-entry equilibrium, (9) requires that S(N I ) = N I F I M , so multiplying the first term on the right hand side by
Now cancel terms and multiply the entire right-hand side by
Applying absolute value notation gives the desired result.
The intuition for Proposition 3 is that the increased fixed costs of having to own a conduit decrease the number of intermediaries, but this can be at least partially offset by the revenue that a conduit earns from offering other services. As we discuss below, one cannot rule out that actually dN I > 0 by appealing to "reasonable" values of the relevant changes.
We know from Lemma 2 that content will increase under closed access if the number of intermediaries is unchanged, so the question now becomes how large the reduction in intermediaries is.
Proposition 4: The number of content firms on a typical intermediary will fall under closed access only if closed access causes a sufficient reduction in the number of intermediaries:
Proof: Content decreases under closed access if the intermediaries' retained surplus increases :
From Lemma 2, the first term in (12) is negative. The fraction in the second term is also negative, so the inequality will only hold if dN I is sufficiently negative.
The intuition here is that closed access must sufficiently reduce the number of intermediaries to counteract its direct, content-increasing effect in Lemma 2. Thus, we conclude that closed access can only reduce content if it results in a reduction in intermediaries.
Network Neutrality
The results about closed access may seem surprising, since much of the network neutrality debate suggests that it is precisely this kind of clo- Suppose that full network neutrality regulation required each intermediary to host every content firm that wanted access. In practice, this would mean that the price for hosting could not exceed some small markup over marginal cost. In that case, the intermediaries could no longer appropriate any surplus from the content firms, and the content firms would no longer earn any super-normal profits. The only remaining surplus available to intermediaries would come from consumers:
We already assumed that v(·) is increasing and concave; it will be simplest now to further assume that
Then there is no longer any stage 2 equilibrium, since content cannot be restricted, and the intermedaries' stage 1 free-entry equilibrium is
Clearly the amount of content on each intermediary must be greater than under open access. And also it is clear that the number of intermediaries must be weakly less, since they earn lower profits.
Comparison
Our results depend crucially on two parameters: F I , the fixed cost of an intermediary, and t, the value of services provided by the conduit other than access to the intermediary. In this section, we consider the relative values of these parameters. If we consider the effect on content, we first note that in the dial-up world, t was very large relative to S because the Internet was in its infancy and thus much less valuable than services like telephone and cable television. This would temper the incentive for an intermediary to restrict content, which may help explain why content exclusion was quite rare even in countries that did have monopoly or duopoly intermediaries. The high value of t also suggests that open access might not increase content greatly, but it seems likely that the very high number of intermediaries would overwhelm any such effect.
Comparing the three policies, we can then make three findings for the low- Overall Welfare Effect. Translating our findings on the number of content firms into economic welfare results depends critically on two factors. First, if DSP indicates decreasing net total surplus due to fixed costs, in the sense of Mankiw and Whinston (1986) , then less content actually increases economic welfare. We think it is more likely that DSP indicates increasing total surplus but decreasing surplus appropriable by the intermediary, in which case reduced content reduces economic welfare. Second, the number of intermediaries and number of conduits also affects welfare, both due to the fixed costs of intermediaries and conduits and because of the value for product differentiation implicit in the logit function. The strength of this effect becomes more important as σ, the variance of preferences, rises. The net effect on total welfare is thus very sensitive to all of these assumptions. We suggest that the greater part of the regulatory policy surveyed above is predicated on the idea that larger numbers of conduits, intermediaries, and content firms are all associated with higher welfare. But we caution that this does not lead to any easy comparisons. Network neutrality, for example, could easily increase the amount of content and decrease the number of intermediaries relative to closed access, making for difficult welfare comparisons.
Conclusion

Extensions
The model we have presented is flexible to a variety of situations that may be important as broadband Internet (and wireless) evolves. The following are some possible extensions and suggestions for future research.
The Online Population. Throughout the model, the number of consumers, M , is assumed constant. In places where broadband is saturated, this assumption is justified, but in growing demand areas, the growing M strengthens the demand effect: more content would bring more people online. The probable result would be greater content competition in equilibrium (under either closed or open access) and less reason for network neutrality regulation in growing markets.
Geographical Footprints. In this model, the conduits and intermediaries are assumed to cover the same geographic area, so that both types of firms compete for the same number of households, M . The major intermediaries actually have a larger geographic footprint than the conduits. A full analysis would include a bargaining decision as independent conduits formed alliances with national or international intermediaries. Multi-homing. Recent papers have examined the situation where network consumers multi-home by using more than one platform (Caillaud and Jullien 2003, Doganoglu and Wright 2006) . They find that multihoming generally increases the competitiveness of the industry. In our setting, multi-homing would involve consumers using more than one intermediary to access content. This would increase competition in the content market, lowering content firm profits and reducing the incentive to restrict content in the first place. If multi-homing were sufficiently widespread, it could produce a network-neutrality-like outcome on its own. However, we believe that the example of Google's large market share in the search-engine market, even though there are other search engines that are free and accessible using the same web browser, suggests that multi-homing exerts limited influence in this market.
Conclusion
The policy debate has proceeded under the assumption that conduits We have emphasized that openness of the conduit to intermediaries is not equivalent to openness of intermediaries to content. The first is a regulatory decision, the second has so far been left to the market. We saw in the model that consolidation in the intermediary industry can lead to less content availability regardless of whether there is open or closed access. If the primary policy goal is to preserve access to content, it may be more effective to consider a network neutrality requirement that includes the intermediaries themselves. 
